A method for solving the Byzantine agreement problem ͓M. Fitzi, N. Gisin, and U. Maurer, Phys. Rev. Lett. 87, 217901 ͑2001͔͒ and the liar detection problem ͓A. Cabello, Phys. Rev. Lett. 89, 100402 ͑2002͔͒ is introduced. The main advantages of this protocol are that it is simpler and is based on a four-qubit singlet state already prepared in the laboratory.
I. INTRODUCTION
Some interesting applications of the N-particle N-level singlet states have been recently introduced ͓1͔. Particularly, the three three-level singlet state 
͑1͒
͑the lower and upper indexes refer, respectively, to the number of constituents and the dimension of the Hilbert space of any of the constituents of the composite system͒ was shown to be useful for solving the ''liar detection problem'' ͓1͔, which is a simplification of a classically unsolvable problem in quantum computing called the ''Byzantine generals' problem'' or the ''Byzantine agreement problem'' introduced in two seminal papers by Lamport, Pease, and Shostak ͓2,3͔, and inspired by a pseudohistorical scenario ͓4͔. A version of this problem was previously solved by Fitzi, Gisin, and Maurer ͓5͔ also using the three three-level singlet state. Ref. ͓1͔ ended by remarking that the preparation of the required states would pose a formidable challenge. Meanwhile, Gisin has proposed a method for preparing the three three-level singlet state ͓6͔. To my knowledge, no experimental results have as yet been reported.
On the other hand, the Munich group ͓7͔ ͑see also Ref. ͓8͔͒ has prepared, using parametric down-converted photons entangled in polarization, a four-qubit entangled state that can be expressed as
This state belongs to a family of states of N ͑even͒ qubits that generalizes the familiar two-qubit singlet state
Any member of this family can be expressed as
where the sum is extended to all of the states obtained by permuting the state ͉0 . . . 01 . . . 1͘, which contains the same number of 0's and 1's; z is the number of 0's in the first N/2 positions ͑for example, in ͉01͘, zϭ1; in ͉1100͘, zϭ0; in ͉010110͘, zϭ2). Expression ͑4͒ is similar to that introduced in Ref.
͓1͔ for the N-particle N-level singlet states ͑which, according to the notation introduced here, should be denoted as ͉S N (N) ͘).
The interesting point is that the N-qubit ''singlet'' ͓9͔ states given by Eq. ͑4͒ share some properties with the N-particle N-level singlet states introduced in Ref. ͓1͔. Both are nonseparable and N-lateral unitary invariant. Nonseparability means that no local model can mimic the predictions of quantum mechanics for these states ͓10͔ and implies that the outcomes of the measurements do not reveal predefined results. N-lateral unitary invariance means that, if we act on any state with the tensor product of N equal unitary operators, the result will be to reproduce the same state:
where U is a unitary operator. This implies that the same correlations between the outcomes of measurements on the N particles occur for different sets of measurements. Both properties were essential to the solutions to the problems proposed in Refs. ͓1,5͔. The question is whether the ͉S N (2) ͘ states can be used to perform tasks that, so far, were specific to the ͉S N (N) ͘ states.
The ͉S N (2) ͘ states can be used to distribute cryptographic keys ͓11,12͔, encode quantum information in decoherencefree subspaces ͓13-16͔, perform secret sharing, and teleclone quantum states ͑telecloning is a process combining quantum teleportation and optimal quantum cloning from 1 input to M outputs͒ ͓17͔. In fact, for Nу4, the ͉S N The Byzantine generals' problem is a classical problem in distributed computing defined as follows. N generals are con-*Electronic address: adan@us.es nected by secure pairwise classical channels. A commanding general must send an order to his NϪ1 lieutenant generals such that ͑1͒ All loyal lieutenant generals obey the same order; ͑2͒ if the commanding general is loyal, then every loyal lieutenant general obeys his order. If the commanding general is loyal, ͑1͒ follows from ͑2͒. However, the commanding general may be a traitor.
The Byzantine generals' problem is a metaphor for distributed processes, some of which may be faulty. For Nϭ3 generals and 1 traitor the problem has no classical solution, as proved in Refs. ͓2,3͔. However, a version thereof can be solved with the aid of quantum mechanics. The protocol proposed in Ref. ͓5͔ solves the Byzantine generals' problem for Nϭ3 in the following sense: if all generals are loyal then, after the protocol, all the generals would obey the commanding general's order. If one general is a traitor then, after the protocol, either the two loyal generals would obey the commanding general's order or abort the process.
As can be easily seen, the Byzantine generals' problem for Nϭ3 generals and 1 traitor is equivalent to the liar detection problem defined as follows ͓1͔: three parties A͑lice͒, B͑ob͒, and C͑arol͒ are connected by secure pairwise classical channels. A sends a message m to B and C, and B forwards the message to C. If both A and B are honest, then C should receive the same message from A and B. However, A could be dishonest and send different messages to B and C, m AB m AC , or, alternatively, B could be dishonest and send a message that is different from that he has received, m BC m AB . For C the problem is to ascertain without a shadow of a doubt who is being dishonest.
In Sec. III I shall introduce a protocol based on the ͉S 4 (2) ͘ state for solving the liar detection problem ͑and thus also the Byzantine generals' problem͒ in the following sense: if both A and B are honest then C will receive the same message from A and B. If one of A and B is dishonest then, after the protocol, either C ascertain who is being dishonest or C does not accept the message from one of the parties A and B. Before getting into the details of the protocol, it would be useful to give a rough idea of how it works: besides their messages, A and B must send some additional information. For instance, A must also send B some private information correlated with the message. B and C must be able to check the authenticity of the information they have received by using private information. In addition, to convince C that the message B is sending her is actually that B received from A, B would also need to send C the information B has received from A. In this scenario, being a liar means that she/he did not distribute the appropriate additional information. The advantage derives from the fact that C can detect the origin of the inappropriate information.
II. DISTRIBUTE AND TEST PROTOCOL
The protocol for solving the liar detection problem described in Sec. III is based on the assumption that, at the beginning of the protocol, A, B, and C share a large number L of four-qubit systems in the ͉S 4 (2) ͘ state described by Eq. ͑2͒ such that, for each four-qubit system j ͑from 1 to L), A possesses two qubits ͑qubits j 1 and j 2 , or qubits j 1 and j 3 , but she does not know which two͒, B possesses one qubit ( j 3 or j 2 , but he does not know which one͒, and C possesses the fourth qubit j 4 and knows which qubits A and B have in their possession.
The purpose of this distribute and test protocol, preceding the protocol for liar detection, is to prepare the initial scenario required for the second protocol and test whether or not said initial scenario has been achieved. The distribute and test protocol has only two possible outcomes: success or failure. In case of success, C would assume that the required initial scenario has been achieved and then the liar detection can be reliably accomplished. In case of failure, C would conclude that something went wrong and would abort any subsequent action.
The initial assumptions are that there are only three parties involved: A, B, and C, and that they are connected by secure pairwise classical channels and by noiseless quantum channels.
The distribute and test protocol is as follows. ͑i͒ C prepares a large number M ϾL of four-qubit systems in the ͉S 4 (2) ͘ state. For each four-qubit system j ͑from 1 to M ), C sends two qubits ͑qubits j 1 and j 2 , or qubits j 1 and j 3 ) to A, one qubit to B ( j 3 or j 2 ), and keeps the fourth qubit for herself.
͑ii͒ For each four-qubit system j sent, C checks whether or not A and B have received the right number of qubits ͑two qubits for A and one for B).
͑iii͒ C randomly chooses two large enough subsets S 1 and S 2 of the distributed four-qubit systems. These subsets are used only to test whether or not the initial scenario required for the protocol for liar detection has been achieved. Qubits belonging to S 1 and S 2 will be discarded at the end of the distribute and test protocol. If N i is the number of four-qubit systems in S i , then M ϭN 1 ϩN 2 ϩL.
͑iv͒ For each four-qubit system j of S 1 , C asks A to send B her two qubits.
͑v͒ C checks whether or not B has received A's qubits. ͑vi͒ C asks B to perform some measurements on each of the three qubits ͑the two qubits B has received from A plus the one that has been in B's possession from the start͒, and report his results to her by using the secure pairwise classical channel between them. For instance, C can ask B to perform a measurement of the spin along the same direction on all three qubits, M j .
͑vii͒ C performs a measurement on her corresponding qubit. For instance, C can measure M j . The outcomes of B and C's measurements must be correlated. For instance, if they have measured M j on the four qubits, two of them must be ''0'' and the other two must be ''1''; due to unitary invariance, this occurs for any M j . Due to the fact that A's qubits are entangled with B and C's qubits, the outcomes can be proved ͓10͔ to be genuinely unpredictable ͑if one does not know the results of the other measurements͒. C checks whether the expected correlations occur.
͑viii͒ For each four-qubit system j of S 2 , C follows the same steps as in ͑iv͒-͑vii͒, only exchanging the roles of A and B.
͑ix͒ Since C's choice of subsets S 1 and S 2 is known by A and B only after all qubits have been distributed among them, then, if all the outcomes are correctly correlated, C would assume that the remaining L distributed four-qubit systems are in the ͉S 4 (2) ͘ state and use them for the protocol described below. If not, C would conclude that something went wrong and abort any subsequent action.
III. PROTOCOL FOR LIAR DETECTION
Let us suppose that the message m that A sends to B and C, and B sends to C is a bit value ''0'' or ''1'' and that all three parties agree to use the following protocol.
͑1͒ For each four-qubit system, C asks A and B to perform the same measurement on their individual qubits. After a large number of these measurements, both B and C ͑A͒ are in possession of a long list of ͑pairs of͒ 0's and 1's l B and l C (l A ) such as the following. 
Each of these lists has the following properties.
͑a͒ It is random ͑i.e., generated by an intrinsically unrepeatable method that gives each possible number the same probability of occurring͒.
͑b͒ It is correlated to the other two lists. If ''00'' ͑''11''͒ is in position j in l A , then ''1'' ͑''0''͒ is in position j in l B and l C .
͑c͒ Each party knows only his/her own list. Requirements ͑2͒ and ͑3͒ force A to send B information which is correct but perhaps incomplete. Otherwise, if A sends a list containing n erroneous data, then the probability that B does not accept the message m AB would be at last (2 n Ϫ1)/2 n . ͑4͒ The message B sends C is denoted as m BC . B must also send C a list l A (m BC ) , which is supposedly the same l A (m AB ) that B has received from A. ͑5͒ The message A sends C is denoted as m AC . A must also send C a list l AC , which is supposedly l A .
͑6͒ When C finds that m AC m BC , she has three lists l C , l A (m BC ) , and l AC , to help her find out whether it is A or B who is being dishonest. C must first check whether l AC is consistent with l C . If not, then A is the liar. If yes, then C must check whether l A (m BC ) has an appropriate length and is consistent with l AC . If not, then B is the liar. At this stage, this is the only possibility.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The main practical advantage of the introduced protocol over those presented in Refs. ͓1,5͔ is that it requires a simpler quantum state ͑a four-qubit state instead of a three-qutrit state͒, which has been already prepared in a laboratory ͓7͔. This would make the new protocol immediately applicable for solving both the Byzantine generals' and liar detection problems. The main theoretical advantage is that the introduced protocol seems to be fundamental in a greater degree than those in Refs. ͓1,5͔, in the sense that it requires that only one party uses trit values, instead of all three parties.
Although both the Byzantine generals' and liar detection problems assume that the parties are connected by secure pairwise classical channels ͑secure messengers in Ref. ͓4͔͒, this is an unrealistic constraint for real applications. Note, however, that the protocol described above also works if the classical channels between A and C, and between B and C are not secure but public and unjamable ͑i.e., which cannot be tampered with͒. Obviously, such a channel cannot be used to distribute delicate information ͑like, for instance, whether or not the generals will attack, or the lists l A (m BC ) and l AC ), but can be used, together with an additional quantum channel, to implement a standard quantum key distribution protocol ͓11,12͔ to send this delicate information. The final picture gives us a quantum solution to a problem without classical solution: the liar detection problem without secure classical channels. AD. The city of Constantinople, the last remnants of the hoary Roman Empire, is under siege. Powerful Ottoman battalions are camped around the city on both sides of the Bosphorus, poised to launch the next, perhaps final, attack. Sitting in their respective camps, the generals are meditating. Because of the redoubtable fortifications, no battalion by itself can succeed; the attack must be carried out by several of them together or otherwise they would be thrusted back and incur heavy losses that would infuriate the Grand Sultan. Worse, that would jeopardize the prospects of a defeated general to become Vizier. The generals can agree on a common plan of action by communicating thanks to the messenger service of the Ottoman Army, which can deliver messages within an hour, certifying the identity of the sender and preserving the content of the message. Some of the generals, however, are secretly conspiring against the others. Their aim is to confuse their peers so that an insufficient number of generals is deceived into attacking. The resulting defeat will enhance their own status in the eyes of the Grand Sultan. The generals start shuffling messages around, those trying to agree on a time to launch the offensive, the others trying to split their ranks . . . '' To my knowledge, however, no historical account of the fall of Constantinople mentions these treacherous generals.
